Abstract A methodology for system-level hardware veri cation based on compositional model checking is described. This methodology relies on a simple set of proof techniques, and a domain speci c strategy for applying them. The goal of this strategy is to reduce the veri cation of a large system to nite state subgoals that are tractable in both size and number. These subgoals are then discharged by model checking. The proof strategy uses proof techniques for design re nement, temporal case splitting, data type reduction and the exploitation of symmetry. Uninterpreted functions can be used to abstract operations on data. A proof system supporting this approach generates veri cation subgoals to be discharged by the SMV symbolic model checker. Application of the methodology is illustrated using an implementation of Tomasulo's algorithm, a packet bu ering device and a cache coherence protocol as examples.
Introduction
Formal methods for hardware veri cation divide into two broad categories. One set of methods is based on model checking and related techniques for nite state machine veri cation. The other is based on automated proof assistants. Model checking methods have the advantage that they can automatically verify a fairly broad class of properties { those expressible in temporal logic, or as the language of an automaton. They also can provide behavioral counterexamples in case a property is false. This can only be done, however, only in the case where the state space of the system being veri ed is relatively small. Realistically if the model being veri ed has 50 or 100 bits of state information, it is likely that it can be successfully veri ed (though not certain). On the other hand, with 500 to 1000 bits of state information, the chance of successful veri cation is slight. This is because model checking methods are based on exhaustively searching the model's state space, either explicitly or implicitly. Thus, one can use model checking methods to verify, for example, fairly complex nite state control circuits, or highly abstracted models of protocols, but not in general circuits that have large data paths or memories. While progress continues to be made in extending model checking to larger systems, real integrated systems are still several orders of magnitude too large to be veri ed in their entirety by model checking, and there is little prospect that this gap will close.
Theorem proving methods, on the other hand, impose no a priori limit on the size or complexity of the system that can be veri ed. One has in principle the possibility of breaking down proofs about very large systems into proofs about smaller components, and thus controlling the complexity of the veri cation process. However, e ective automation for handling the detailed aspects of the proof has been lacking. As a result, when using a proof assistant, one is typically obliged to posit inductive invariants of the system, which can be quite detailed. Proving these invariants may involve interactively constructing very detailed proof scripts, in which the user guides the prover through an extensive case analysis. Inductive invariants and proofs scripts must also be maintained as the design changes.
It is natural to suppose that a synthesis of the two veri cation styles could be made, whereby the details of the proof are handled automatically by a model checker, while the reasoning at a more abstract level is handled by a proof assistant. In fact, some work has been done on integrating model checking algorithms into the framework of a theorem prover Sha96]. However, integration of theorem proving and model checking tools is not su cient by itself to provide a practical method of veri cation. One also requires a proof methodology that naturally yields proof subgoals veri able by model checking. These subgoals must be reasonably small in number, and the state spaces involved must be small enough to allow a high con dence that model checking can be completed successfully.
The purpose of this article is to propose such a methodology, for the particular domain of hardware veri cation. The proof strategy is based on a small collection of techniques used to reduce large (possibly in nite state) veri cation problems to small nite state problems. These techniques have been implemented in a special-purpose proof system that produces nite state veri cation subgoals to be discharged by the SMV model checker McM93] . The system to be veri ed, its speci cation, and the proof itself are all expressed in a somewhat extended hardware description language. Potentially, however, a similar system could be implemented as a \tactic" within a general purpose proof assistant. It should be noted that the process of proof decomposition is not automatic. It is aided by automatic tools, but requires human insight about the structure and function of the design being veri ed.
The scope of this article
This article is intended to provide an overview of a methodology, as opposed to a rigorous formal treatment. Thus, while proof techniques are introduced here in the abstract, we will not consider in detail the underlying model theory or prove that the techniques are sound in a given theory. These or similar techniques could be derived in many contexts. The intention here is to motivate the approach intuitively, and to illustrate by example a strategy by which the various techniques can be combined to reduce the veri cation of complex systems to small model checking problems.
We will begin, in the next section, with a discussion of the overall proof strategy in general terms. Following that, the method is illustrated by application to a simple implementation of Tomasulo's algorithm Tom67], a technique of implementing out-of-order execution in instruction set processors. This will provide a more detailed view of how the methodology is supported by the SMV model checking system. There follows a less detailed discussion of two additional examples, a communications application and the cache coherence system of a multiprocessor. Details of these examples are omitted, as they are intended principally to show by example that the methodology generalizes to systems other than instruction processors. A discussion of related work is postponed to the end of the article, to allow a more meaningful comparison of techniques.
Preliminaries
Temporal logic is a logical language commonly used for expressing properties of concurrent systems. Here, we will use the variant called linear temporal logic or LTL. In its propositional version it allows the usual propositional operators (and, or and not) and in additional a collection of temporal operators used to express relations in time. For example, given a proposition p, the formula Fp is true at a given time if p is true at some time in the future, the formula Gp is true when p holds at all times in the future, and Xp is true when p holds at the next time instant (assuming time is discrete). The formula p U q is true at a given time if q holds at some instant in the future, and p holds at all times at all times up to, but not necessarily including, that instant.
In LTL, a model is an in nite sequence s 0 ; s 1 ; : : : of states, representing consecutive time instants. Each formula is either true or false in a given state. We write (M; s i ) j = if the formula is true in state s i of model M. Thus, for example: (M; s i ) j = X i (M; s i+1 ) j = (M; s i ) j = U i for some j i, (M; s j ) j = and for all i k < j, (M; s k ) j = We say a model satis es a formula, and write M j = , when the formula is true in the initial state (that is, when (M; s 0 ) j = ). If a formula is true in all models, we say it is valid and write j = . The decision problem is to determine whether a given formula is valid. Given a nite state graph, the model checking problem is to determine whether the formula is true for all paths in the state graph starting with an initial state. For propositional LTL, both these problems are PSPACE complete, and can be solved in time exponential in the formula size VW86, LP85]. In the model checking case, the time used is linear in the size of the state graph, and exponential in the formula size. In practice, there is little operational distinction between validity checking (truth in all models) and model checking (truth in all paths in a state graph), since the state graph itself is usually characterized implicitly by a logical formula. The most important factor in the complexity of model checking nite state systems tends to be the number of reachable states, that is, feasible combinations of the state variables used to model the system. Since the number of reachable states can be exponential in the number of state variables, model checking is only e ective in practice for models with a relatively small number of state variables.
Proof strategy
We now outline a proof strategy, based on a set of somewhat domain speci c proof techniques, that is intended to reduce the veri cation of large, complex hardware systems to subproblems with few enough state variables to be veri able by model checking. The overall approach is to verify that an abstract model, acting as the system speci cation, is implemented by some more detailed system model. Implementation is de ned in terms of re nement relations that relate signaling behavior at suitable points in the implementation with events occurring in the abstract model. This situation is depicted in gure 1. Typically, the abstract model, the implementation and the re nement relationss are all expressed in the same HDL-like language, as sets of equations that may involve time delay. Formally, these are all viewed as \syntactic sugar" for properties in temporal logic. The re nement relations decompose the veri cation problem into smaller parts for separate, localized, veri cation. This is the most basic way in which large proofs are broken into smaller proofs. To do this, we rely on a technique of circular compositional proof which allows us to assume that one relation holds true while verifying another, and vice versa. In e ect, the re nement relations allow us to use the abstract model as a context for verifying local components of the detailed model. Thus, we avoid the di cult problem of verifying components of the design in an unconstrained environment.
Having made a macro level decomposition of the problem by re nement relations, one is then commonly left with large data structures, such as memories or register les. These generally cannot be handled directly by a model checker because they have a large number of state bits. However, we can often reduce the model down to just one or two components of the larger structure by means of temporal case splitting. Using this technique, we can verify separately only those data items that pass through a given xed element of a large array, and thus greatly reduce the number of state bits in the model checking problem. This technique is called path splitting. It allows us to consider individually every path that a data item might take through a given system, and to reduce the number of state variables in the model checking problem accordingly.
Use of re nement relations and path splitting can result in a very large number of individual cases to verify (each of which yields a model checking problem). We can often reduce these to a small, representative number of cases, however, by exploiting symmetry. The implementation of this technique in the SMV proof system is based on the use of symmetric data types called scalarsets, borrowed from the Murphi system ID96]. Type checking ensures that a scalarset variable is used only in symmetric ways, guaranteeing that the truth of a given formula is invariant under permutations of the scalarset type. This allows a symmetry reduction to reduce a large (or even in nite) parameterized class of proof subgoals to just a few representative cases. Note that symmetry is not used here to reduce state space size, as it is in the Murphi system. Finally, after the large arrays have been reduced to their individual components, one may still be left with large data types, such as addresses, or data words. Note that \large" here means that the type has a large number of possible values, not that it requires a large amount of storage space. In this case, a data type reduction can be used. This reduces a large (perhaps in nite) type to a small nite one, containing only one or two values that are of interest for the case being veri ed.
The remaining values are represented by a single abstract value. Thus, data types represented by 32 or 64 bits can be reduced to just one or two bits for the purpose of model checking.
The above elements can be assembled into a general proof strategy for hardware designs. Using this approach, one can reduce the veri cation of a large and complex system down to nite state veri cation problems with small numbers of state bits. When the number of state bits in each proof subgoal is su ciently small, veri cation can proceed in a completely automated way without further manual intervention. Thus, we do not rely on a powerful model checker to handle very large problems (though this can be useful), but rather on our ability to decompose large veri cation problems into small ones. Nonetheless, model checking is still a crucial component of this strategy. The application of model checking relieves the user of responsibility for the details of the proof, in particular of the the need to write inductive invariants. The result is a scalable, practical methodology for system level hardware veri cation.
We will now consider in a little more detail the various proof techniques described above, and how they are combined in a global proof strategy.
Re nement and circular compositional proofs
As mentioned above, in re nement veri cation, we specify a collection of temporal properties called re nement relations. These relate the behavior of a simple abstract model to a more complex and detailed implementation. While re nement relations can be arbitrary temporal properties, in practice they usually are downward translations, mapping events or data in the abstract model to corresponding signaling sequences at some chosen point in the implementation. Thus, for example, in gure 1, the temporal property 1 de nes the legal behaviors of signal A, as function of the abstract model, while 2 de nes the legal behaviors of signal B.
The re nement relations, once speci ed, can be used to to break the veri cation problem into smaller parts. For example, when we verify that signal B satis es speci cation 2 , we simply assume that signal A satis es 1 . This allows us to abstract away unit U 2 . In e ect, the asbtract model becomes the \environment" for verifying unit U 1 . Similarly, when verifying that signal A satis es property 1 , we assume 2 and abstract away unit U 1 . This approach solves a signi cant practical problem in system level veri cation. That is, we often cannot verify any useful properties of a given unit in a unconstrained environment. In this case, the abstract model provides the necessary environment constraits, by way of the re nement relations.
Note that, on the face of it, this reasoning is circular, since we have assumed 1 to prove 2 , and assumed 2 to prove 1 . However, there is a way of stating this argument which is in fact logically sound. To do this, we break the circularity by induction over time. When we prove that property 2 holds at time t, we assume that 1 holds at all times from 0 up to t ? 1. Similarly, to prove that 1 holds at time t, we assume that 2 holds at all times from 0 up to t ? 1. We can then infer by induction over time that both 1 To use the circular compositional technique to verify a collection of re nement relations, the user need only specify an \environment" for proving each relation, in terms of i and ? i . In practice, as we will see later, only a small subset of the environment needs to be speci ed explicitly. The rest can be inferred using heuristics, including a \cone of in uence" analysis.
2.1.1 Circular compositional reasoning with combinational paths It may happen that assuming 1 up to time t ? 1 when proving 2 is not su cient. This might be the case, for example, if the unit U 1 contained a combinational logic path from its input A to its output B. In this case, a change in A would be re ected at B with no intervening delay. Thus, it might be necessary to assume that 1 holds up to and including time t to prove correctness of 2 at time t. This can be done by slightly generalizing the circular compositional proof technique. First, we put all of the properties i into a well-founded order that re ects the combinational dependency relation between the signals. For example, if signal B depends on A via some zero delay path (but not the other way around), then we say 1 < 2 . If 1 < 2 , we can assume 1 up to time t when proving 2 at time t, otherwise we assume 1 only up to time t ? 1. That is, in general, we divide the \environment abstraction" for property i into two subsets, i being those properties less than i in the order (and thus assumed up to time t), and i being those not less than i (and thus assumed up to time t ? 1). It is then su cient to prove for every i that:
to infer G i for all i. In essence, we show that no property i is the rst to fail, where \ rst" is determined primarily by time, but in case of a tie is determined by the given well-founded order on the properties. It follows that no property ever fails. Note once again that because the proof subgoals are expressed in temporal logic, they can be veri ed directly by model checking. It should also be noted that the above proof goals are generated automatically by the proof system and not written by the user. The user supplies only the re nement relations. Further, the distinction between i and i is for the most part invisible to the user. The proof system makes this distinction automatically, based on a data-ow analysis of the system.
Auxiliary state
A useful strategy in de ning re nement relations is to add auxiliary state information to the design. Usually, an auxiliary state variable is associated with a particular component of the design. It carries either the correct value of the data stored in that component, (according to the abstract model) or a pointer to that value in the abstract model. When introducing de nitions of auxiliary variables, we must ensure that adding these de nitions does not a ect the truth value of propositions about existing implementation variables. Thus, if we can prove a property using some auxiliary de nitions, we know that the property remains true when the auxiliary de nitions are removed. This principle is known as \conservative extension".
Typically, conservative extension is ensured in a theorem proving system by requiring that each new de nition introduces a new object never before referenced. However, it is useful to be able to write auxiliary de nitions that are mutually dependent, provided conservative extension can be guaranteed (for example, this is useful for de ning the internal state of abstract models).
In the SMV system, a signal de nition is a nondeterministic assignment. This assignment gives the set of possible values for the signal at time t, as a function of other signals at time t, or time t ? 1. The former case is referred to as a zero delay assignment, while the latter case is referred to as a unit delay assignment. Formally, these are both just special cases of temporal properties. SMV guarantees conservative extension by enforcing the following rules: No implementation signal depends on an auxiliary signal. Each auxiliary signal is assigned only once. Every dependency cycle in the auxiliary signal assignments is broken by a unit delay. Within the above rules, the user is free to introduce any number of auxiliary signals, arbitrarily de ned, in no particular order. The rules ensure that for any implementation behavior, we can compute at least one behavior of the auxiliary signals that satis es the auxiliary de nitions. This allows us to make the following inference:
where A is the set of auxiliary de nitions, and v A is the set of auxiliary variables. That is, if we can prove a property using the implementation ? and the auxiliary de nitions A, then it follows that every implementation behavior satis es for some valuation of the auxiliary signals. The auxiliary de nitions provide the \witness" for this existential quanti er.
Note that this use of auxiliary variables is essentially the same as that introduced by Owicki and Gries OG76]. The primary di erence is that, in the Owicki and Gries method, the auxiliary variables are de ned by statements added to a sequential program, whereas here they are introduced by signal assignments.
Temporal case splitting
Recall that our overall goal is to reduce a large veri cation problem down to small nite state problems. Having decomposed the veri cation problem into localized subproblems, using re nement relations and auxiliary state, the next problem that usually arises is the presence of large structures, such as register les, memories, FIFO bu ers, etc. The number of state bits in these structures is often too large to handle them in their entirety with model checking. We solve this problem by splitting the veri cation subgoals into cases, where each case corresponds to just one element in a large structure (for example, just one memory address). Typically, this means that when verifying that correct data appear at the output of a given unit containing a register le, we will consider only the correctness of those data items that happen to have been stored in register i. When verifying the property for a particular value of i, we can abstract away the other elements of the register le, giving them an unde ned value. The state space of the resulting model checking problem is thus reduced, since it involves only one register instead of many. This situation is depicted in gure 2. To verify the correctness of only those data items that pass through a particular element in a large structure, we use temporal case splitting. This method is used to prove that a particular property holds at all times. It breaks the proof into cases based on the value of a given variable v. For each possible value i of v, we show that is true at just those times when v = i. Since at all times v must have some value, we can then infer that must be true at all times. Thus, if we can prove separately for each i that G((v = i) ) ), we can infer G .
Typically, v is an auxiliary variable which keeps track of the location in some large data structure which was used to store a given item appearing at a unit output. In some cases, such a variable may already be present in the implementation (for example, the address eld on a bus indicates which memory cell a given data item was obtained from). By case splitting, we obtain one proof subgoal for each possible value i of v. Each case requires that property hold at those times when v = i (for example, those times when the current data item passed through memory location i).
Thus, to prove each case, we commonly need to use the implementation de nition of just one cell in the array. In e ect, we have decomposed a large array into its individual components for the purposes of veri cation. This technique might be referred to as \path splitting", since we prove one case for each possible path that a given data item might take through a system.
Symmetry reductions
Clearly, the path splitting approach trades o a problem of state explosion for a problem of case explosion. For example, to prove a property of a memory of 2 32 bytes, we would have 2 32 separate cases to prove. Or, suppose that a data item entering a unit is stored rst in element i of register le A, and then in element j of register le B, before being sent to an output. Here, we have two cases splits to perform, yielding O(n 2 ) cases to prove, where n is the number of registers in each le. Verifying all of these cases would be wasteful, since it is likely that most of the cases are isomorphic. In other words, we should be able to prove just one case (say, i = 0, j = 0) and then infer all of the other cases \by symmetry".
In fact, this is possible, provided we make the symmetry in the system explicit. In the SMV system, this is done by means of symmetric data types called scalarsets ID96] . Restrictions on the use of scalarset types ensure that the semantics of all assertions is invariant under permutations of values of a scalarset type. That is, we can swap the roles of any two constants of the type, without changing the truth value of a given formula. This property is enforced by means of type checking rules. In practice, this means that scalarset variables can be compared for equality against variables of the same type, but no other operations may be applied to them. In addition, they may be used as array indices, and arrays or functions over scalarset types may be \summed" using any commutative-associative operator. For example, we can form the logical conjunction of p(i), for all i, where i is of scalarset type. Any other use of a scalarset variable breaks the symmetry of the type. In particular, individual constants of scalarset types may not be directly introduced without breaking the symmetry. Now suppose that we have split a property into cases based on the value i of a scalarset variable v, and that we have proved the case i = 0. We can then infer that the case i = 1 holds as well, since we obtain the case i = 0 from i = 1 by simply transposing the values 0 and 1 of the scalarset type. We know that the truth value of formulas is invariant under such permutations. The same argument holds for all other values of the type. Thus, it is su cient to prove just one case, say i = 0, to infer all the others by symmetry.
Carrying on, if we split cases based on two values i and j, of the same scalarset type, then it is su cient to prove cases i = 0; j = 0 and i = 0; j = 1. All the cases where i = j can be reduced to the former by permuting scalarset values, while all the cases where i 6 = j can be reduced to the latter. In general, if has some free parameter i of a scalarset type, and if contains the constants 0 : : : k ? 1 of the given type, it is su cient to prove for the cases i = 0 : : : k to infer that holds for all i. The idea is that all cases i > k are equivalent to i = k, by simply exchanging the constants i and k. As a result, if we have n parameters of a given scalarset type, then after applying the above reduction n times we will have n! subgoals to prove (for the rst parameter, k = 0, for the second k = 1 and so on). For example, if we have split cases on three addresses, ranging from 0 to 2 32 ? 1, then we will have 3! = 6 subgoals to prove instead of the 2 32 2 32 2 32 subgoals we would have without symmetry reduction.
In order to use symmetry reduction in practice, we have only to specify the scalarset types of the variables. A representative set of cases for each property can then be generated automatically by the proof system.
Data type reductions
Up to this point, we have seen how to break the veri cation of large systems down to more localized subgoals by specifying re nement relations. The large structures are then broken down into their individual elements by path splitting, and the resulting large number of cases is reduced to a tractable number by symmetry considerations. At this point, there usually remains one additional impediment to obtaining tractably small state spaces for model checking. That is the presence of types with large (or in nite) ranges, such as addresses and data words.
Large data types are dealt with by reducing them to smaller abstract types. For example, if we are proving case v = i of a property, where v is of a given type T, then we might reduce type T to just two values: the speci c value i that we are interested in, and an abstract value T n i to represent all the other values in the type. A variable of the reduced type can thus be represented by a single bit. Having abstracted the model in this way, we use a corresponding abstract interpretation of formulas. This interpretation guarantees that any property that is true in the reduced model is also true in the original model (that is, it is a \conservative abstraction"). For example, consider the equality comparison operation. In order to obtain a conservative abstraction, we use the following truth table for equality:
That is, clearly the speci c value i is equal to itself, and not equal T n i, since this represents all the values not equal to i. However, two values not equal to i may themselves be equal or unequal. The abstraction does not present enough information to make the distinction. Thus, to be conservative, the result of comparing T n i and T n i for equality is the unknown value ?. With this interpretation, we can be sure that a property veri ed on the model with the reduced type is also true of the unreduced model. It is possible, however, for the truth value of a formula in the reduced model to be ?, in which case we obtain no information about the formula.
In practice, an appropriate data type reduction for a given type can often be inferred automatically, based on the particular case being veri ed. For example, if the case we are verifying has two parameters, i and j, both of type T, then by default type T would be reduced to the set fi; jg, plus an abstract value.
Summary
In summary, we have seen a collection of proof techniques designed to be used in a general strategy for hardware veri cation. Their primary purpose is to reduce the veri cation of large systems to a small number of tractable model checking problems. The framework of the proof strategy is re nement veri cation. Here, we specify the behavior of a system with respect to an abstract model, by means of re nement relations, or translations from abstract to detailed behavior. Re nement relations can be introduced as needed to divide the global veri cation problem into localized subproblems. In each subproblem, a part of the implementation is veri ed in the environment of the abstract model, with the re nement relations acting as intermediary. A method of circular compositional proof makes this style of proof decomposition possible.
For pure control logic, this style of structural decomposition is often su cient to reduce the veri cation to small nite state subgoals. However, for designs with data, additional reductions are required. First, the large structures, such as memories and FIFO bu ers, are divided into their individual elements by means of path splitting. This allows us to consider each possible path that a data item might take through a system as a separate case, and thus allows us to abstract away all but a few elements of the large structures. The large number of resulting cases is then reduced to Finally, the types with large or in nite ranges (such as memory addresses, or packet identi ers) are reduced to small nite types by means of a data type reduction. A suitable abstract interpretation of operators guarantees that the reduced model is a conservative abstraction of the original. The result is a set of proof subgoals whose models are small enough to handle directly with model checking.
6 Verifying a version of Tomasulo's algorithm
In this section, we will see a concrete example of how the above strategy can be applied to reduce a large veri cation problem to tractable nite state proof subgoals.
Tomasulo's algorithm
Tomasulo's algorithm Tom67] allows an instruction set processor to execute instructions in dataow order, rather than sequential order. This can increase the throughput of the unit, by allowing instructions to be processed in parallel, or avoiding pipeline stalls due to hazards. Each pending instruction is held in a \reservation station" until the values of its operands become available, then issued \out-of-order".
The ow of instructions in our implementation of Tomasulo's algorithm is pictured in gure 3. Each instruction, as it arrives, fetches its two operands from a special register le. Each register in this le holds either an actual value, or a \tag" indicating the reservation station that will produce the register value when it completes. The instruction and its operands (either values or tags) are stored in a reservation station. The reservation station watches the results returning from the execution pipelines, and when a result's tag matches one of its operands, it records the value in place of the tag. When the reservation station has the values of both of its operands, it may issue its instruction to an execution pipeline. When the tagged result returns from the pipeline, the reservation station is cleared, and the result value, if needed, is stored in the destination register. However, if a subsequent instruction has modi ed the register tag, the result is discarded. This is because its value in a sequential execution would be overwritten.
In addition to ALU instructions, our implementation includes instructions that read register values to an external output and write values from an external input. There is also a \stall" output, indicating that an instruction cannot currently be received. A stall can happen either because there is no available reservation station to store the instruction, or because the value of the register to be read to an output is not yet available.
Structural decomposition
To specify our machine, we begin by writing an abstract model. The abstract model is a simple implementation of the instruction set that executes the instructions one at a time in sequence (this is commonly referred to as an \instruction set architecture" model). The abstract model is shown schematically in gure 4. In this case, the input and output signals of the abstract model and the implementation are the same, so there is no need to write re nement relations for them. Typically, the rst decomposition one makes when verifying an instruction set processor is to break the problem into two lemmas. The rst states that operands fetched for instructions are correct, while the second states that the results produced from these operands are correct. Each of these lemmas is a re nement relation. In this case, the rst relation speci es the operand values stored in the reservation stations, while the second speci es the values returning on the result bus from the execution units. Naturally, we apply circular compositional proof, using operand correctness to prove result correctness and result correctness to prove operand correctness.
The use of these two re nement relations divides the veri cation of our instruction set processor fairly neatly in two parts. When proving that the fetched operands are correct, we use the result re nement relation to specify the result bus. This eliminates from the proof all of the logic involved in issuing instructions to the execution units, the execution units themselves, and the completion logic that routes execution results onto the result bus. This logic is removed from the model automatically by data ow analysis. That is, when we choose to de ne the result bus values according to the re nement relation, the dependency of this bus on the execution unit logic is eliminated. A so-called \cone of in uence" reduction therefore removes this logic from the model, on the grounds that it cannot in uence the model checking result. The resulting system abstraction is depicted in gure 5. Conversely, when the result correctness lemma is proved, we assume that the operands fetched by the reservation stations are correct, and hence we eliminate all of the operand fetch logic and the register le from the model. 
Auxiliary state
In order to be able to specify re nement relations for the operand and result values, we need to know what the correct values for these data items actually are. We obtain this information by adding auxiliary state to the model. In this case, our auxiliary state variables record the correct values of the operands and result of each instruction, as computed by the abstract model. These values are recorded at the time an instruction enters the machine and is stored in a reservation station. This operation is depicted in gure 6, along with the SMV assignments that implement it. For the auxiliary state, we use an array aux with one element per reservation station. The signal st indicates the reservation station in which the incoming instruction is being stored. Thus, if the machine does not stall, and if the incoming instruction is an ALU operation (meaning it is destined for an execution unit), then we store in the auxiliary array the correct values of the two operands (opra and oprb) and the result res from the abstract model. Storing these values will allow us to verify that the actual operands and results we eventually obtain are correct. As mentioned earlier, assignments are just a special case of temporal properties. In this case, we have unit delay assignments, which specify the next value of a signal as a function of the current values of some other signals. Also note that, as aux is an auxiliary signal, the implementation is not allowed to refer to it.
In SMV, the re nement relations themselves are normally also written as assignments. They could be written as arbitrary temporal formulas, but the assignment form has the advantage that we can readily determine which signals each signal depends on when performing the \cone of in uence" computation. These assignments are special, however, in that they are properties to be proved, and not part of the implementation. They are grouped into named collections called layers. Layers have a special function in the \design by re nement" mechanism of SMV McM99b], but for present purposes can be thought of as simply collections of properties to be proved. In particular, it is possible to specify many re nement relations assigning the same signal, but only if they are contained in di erent layers. Thus, we can uniquely identify a property to be proved by specifying the name of the signal assigned, and the name of the layer containing the assignment.
As an example, here is the SMV speci cation for the operand correctness layer (for the opra operand): It says that, for all reservation stations i, if the tag of the returning result on the bus pout is i, and if the result is valid, then its value must be the correct result value for reservation station i, as stored in the auxiliary array aux. Note that in this case we have de ned an array of re nement relations, one for each reservation station. All specify the same signal, pout.val. Also note that in these two re nement relations, the only implementation signals that we refer to are the reservation station operands, the reservation station valid bits, and the result bus. There is no reference in the proof, for example, to the register le, the issue logic, the execution units or the completion logic. As a result, this proof is likely to be more robust with respect to small design changes than a proof that references many signals. We will observe this later when introducing a \re-order bu er" to the design.
Path splitting
Although the re nement relations divide the implementation into two parts for the purpose of veri cation, there are still large structures in the model that prevent us from applying model checking at this point. These are the register le array, the reservation station array and the execution unit array. Therefore, we break the veri cation problem into cases, as a function of the particular path a data item takes when moving from one re nement relation to another.
Consider, for example, a value returning on the result bus. This result was produced by some reservation station i (which we will call the producer). It then (possibly) gets stored in a register j. Finally it is read as an operand for reservation station k (which we will call the consumer). This suggests a case split which will reduce the size of the veri cation problem for operand correctness to just two reservation stations and one register. For each operand arriving at consumer reservation station k, we split cases based on the producer reservation station i that it came from (this is indicated by the \tag" of the operand) and on the register j that it passed through (this is the source operand index for the given instruction). To prove this one case, we use just reservation stations i and k, and register j. The other elements of these arrays are abstracted away by assigning them unde ned values. This situation is depicted in gure 7. That is, for all consumer reservation stations k, we break the operand correctness lemma into an array of cases (i; j), where i is the producer reservation station and j is the source register. Note that we have to add an auxiliary variable to remember source operand register srca, since the implementation does not store this information. Verifying each case requires only one register and two reservation stations in the model. Thus, we have e ectively broken the large data structures down into their components for veri cation purposes. For the result lemma a similar case splitting declaration can be speci ed; we split cases on the producing reservation station of the result on the bus, and the execution unit that computed it. When these declarations are made, the SMV proof system automatically chooses a set of representative cases under symmetry. In this instance it chooses the cases (i = 0; j = 0; k = 0) and (i = 0; j = 0; k = 1). All of the remaining cases reduce to one of these by permuting the scalarset types. Thus, we have reduced O(n 3 ) cases to just two.
Exploiting symmetry
Note that declaring types to be scalarsets means that we can use values of these types as array indices, and we can compare them for equality, but we can't perform any other operations on them if we want to make use of symmetry reduction for these types. Fortunately, these are (with one exception) the only operations that are required on the index types, as no actual computation is performed on them. The exception is the allocation of empty reservation stations for incoming instructions. This will typically include some form of priority encoder, which will break the symmetry of reservation station indices. However, for purposes of verifying the operand correctness lemma, we do not need to use this logic in the environment { a completely nondeterministic allocation policy will su ce. Hence we do not break the symmetry when verifying the lemma. In general, when applying symmetry reduction to a particular type, SMV automatically excludes any assignments that break the symmetry of the type from the environment. This guarantees that the proof subgoal we are checking obeys the scalarset type rules, and hence that the symmetry reduction is sound.
In nite-state veri cation
Up to this point we have de ned re nement relations, used path splitting to decompose the large structures, and applied symmetry to reduce the number of cases to a tractable level. There remains, however, the issue of large types, in this case, the data values and possibly the index types. To handle these, we use a data type reduction to reduce the types to small sets consisting a few \interesting" values (for the particular case we are proving) and an abstract value to represent the rest. In fact, using data type reduction, we can verify our implementation for an arbitrary (or in nite!) number of registers and reservation stations. To do this, we simply declare the index types to be scalarsets with unde ned range, as follows:
scalarset REG undefined; scalarset TAG undefined; When verifying the operand correctness lemma, for example, for a given case (i; j; k), SMV will automatically reduce the type TAG to just three values: i, k and an abstract value to represent the rest. Similarly, the type REG will be reduced to just two values: j and an abstract value. As a result, in the model checker, only two bits will be used to represent tags (enough to represent 3 values), while one bit will be used to represent register indices.
Note that data type reductions can also be speci ed manually, but in the present case the default reductions are adequate, so no action needs to be taken by the user.
Uninterpreted functions
Finally, we come to the question of data values. Suppose, for example that the data path is 64 bits wide. Although model checkers can handle some arithmetic operations (such as addition and subtraction) at this width, they cannot typically handle others (such as multiplication). Moreover, it would be better to verify our implementation of Tomasulo's algorithm generically, independent of the arithmetic operations implemented by the instruction set. We can do this by introducing an uninterpreted function symbol f for the ALU function. Assuming only that the abstract model and the implementation execution units compute the same function f, we should be able to prove that our implementation is correct regardless of the ALU function. Using an uninterpreted function symbol also has the advantage that the symmetry of data values is not broken. Thus, we can apply symmetry reductions to data values, and as a result, consider only a few representative cases of data values rather than all 2 64 possible values.
To introduce an uninterpreted function in SMV, we simply declare an array to represent the lookup table of With this abstraction, we can easily deal with any size data word, by declaring the type of data words to be a scalarset. In fact, we can leave the actual range of the type undeclared, so that in principle we are verifying the implementation for any size data type. We then use case splitting on the data values to reduce the problem to a nite state problem. In particular, we verify the result correctness lemma for only the case when the operands are some particular values a and b, and where the result f a] b] is some particular value c. Since we have three parameters a, b and c of the same type, the number of cases we require to have a representative set is just 3! = 6. Here is the declaration we use in SMV to split the problem into cases: Given this declaration, SMV will automatically apply symmetry reduction to reduce an in nite number of cases to just 6 representative ones. In addition, it will automatically reduce the (possibly in nite) type of data words to just the speci c values a, b and c, and an abstract value. Thus, in the worst case, when a, b and c are all di erent values, the number of bits required to encode data words for the model checker is two. Thus, we have reduced an in nite state veri cation problem to a nite number of nite state problems.
Summary
The result of applying the above described proof decomposition is a set of proof subgoals that can be solved by model checking (and which, if false, will yield sequential counterexamples). Our implementation of Tomasulo's algorithm is veri ed for an arbitrary ( nite or in nite) number of registers and reservation stations, for an arbitrary ( nite or in nite) size data word, and for an arbitrary ALU function. It is also possible to use similar techniques to verify it for an arbitrary number of execution units (this requires one \noninterference lemma", which is not discussed here). All told, there are 11 cases of the various lemmas to prove: two cases each for the opra and oprb operand correctness, 6 cases for the result correctness, and one case for the correctness of the data output (not discussed here). For the case of one execution unit, the largest model checking problem has 25 state variables. As a result, the overall veri cation time (including the generation of proof goals and model checking) is just under 4 CPU seconds (on SPARC Ultra II server). The veri cation time for 8 execution units is roughly one minute. The time required for an experienced user of SMV (the author) to write, debug and verify the proof was approximately an hour and ten minutes (the design itself was already debugged and was previously formally veri ed using an earlier methodology). 1 In summary, the basic strategy we used to reduce the veri cation problem to tractable model checking problems was the following:
1. Re nement relations and auxiliary state. We broke the problem into two parts, by writing re nement relations that specify the correct values for the operands and results obtained in the implementation. To do this, the correct values are obtained from the abstract model, and stored in auxiliary state.
2. Path splitting. We broke the large data structures (the register le and reservation station array) down into just a few components by splitting cases on the path taken by a data item from one re nement relation to another.
3. Symmetry. The large number of cases produced by the above two steps are reduced to a small nite number by considerations of symmetry.
4. Data type reductions. After case splitting, we reduced the large (or in nite) types, such as data words, to small nite types, representing all the irrelevant values by a single abstract value. A special case of this is the uninterpreted function abstraction, in which we use a lookup table to represent and arbitrary function, then split cases such that we use only one element of the table for each case.
Adding a re-order bu er
Now, suppose that we modify the design to use a \re-order bu er". This means that instead of writing results to the register le when they are produced by an execution unit, we store them in a bu er, and write them back to the register le in program order. This is usually done so that the processor can be returned to a consistent state after an \exceptional" condition occurs, such as an arithmetic over ow. The simplest way to do this in the present implementation is to store the 1 Details of this example (and extending the proof to an arbitrary number of execution units) can be found in a tutorial on SMV, included with the SMV software. At the time of this writing, the software and tutorial can be downloaded from the following URL:
http://www-cad.eecs.berkeley.edu/~kenmcmil/smv. result in an extra eld res of the reservation station, and then modify the allocation algorithm so that reservation stations are allocated and freed in round-robin order. The result of an instruction is written to the register le when its reservation station is freed.
Interestingly, after this change, the processor can be veri ed without modifying one line of the proof! This is because our three lemmas (for operands, results and noninterference) are not a ected by the design change. This highlights an important di erence between the present methodology and techniques such as BD94, JDB95, HB95, SJD98, VB98a, BBCZ98], which are based on symbolic simulation. Because we are using model checking it is not necessary to write inductive invariants of the design. Instead, we rely on model checking to compute the strongest invariant of an abstracted model. Thus, our proof only speci es the values of three key signals: the source operands in the reservation stations, the value on the result bus and the tag on the result bus. Since the function of these signals was not changed in adding the re-order bu er, our proof is still valid. On the other hand, if we had to write inductive invariants, these would involve in some way all of the state holding variables. Thus, after changing the control logic and adding data elds, we would have to modify the invariants. Of course, in some cases, such as very simple pipelines, almost all states will be reachable, so the required invariant will be quite simple. However in the case of a system with more complex control (such as an out-of-order processor), the invariants are nontrivial, and must be modi ed to re ect design changes. While this is not an obstacle in theory, in practice a methodology that requires less proof maintenance is a signi cant advantage.
In the next section we will consider applications of the same basic strategy to other hardware examples, with somewhat di erent characteristics.
7 Other applications 7.1 A packet bu ering application
The rst example is a component of the InfoPad wireless terminal TPDB98] developed at the University of California. In this hand-held device, a variety of multimedia data sources and sinks, including a pen input device, speech input and output, a video stream a graphics, are connected via an 8-bit bus. A component called the \transmit multiplexer", implemented as an ASIC, is used to consolidate byte-at-a-time transfers over the multiplexed bus into complete packets, sending the completed packets to an FPGA for encoding and eventual transmission by a wireless modem. Truman Tru98] reports on the speci cation and veri cation of a model of this bu ering device, using compositional model checking and a re nement based methodology. An earlier version of SMV was used for this purpose. Here we consider not the speci c proof in that paper, but how the present methodology might be applied to the transmit bu er, and similar packet storage and forwarding devices. Nonetheless, the important ideas in the proof are due to Truman.
In this case, the abstract model is extremely simple. It consists simply of a stream of arbitrary packets to be sent by each each source device. The streams are represented by arrays, whose content is unde ned, except that it is constant in time. No operation is performed on these arrays, since the system only transfers data and does not perform any actual computation. Given that packet streams are presented appropriately at the input of the transmit bu er, we wish to show that the same data appears in an appropriate manner at the output. The manner of presentation of data at the input and output is speci ed by re nement relations. This situation is depicted in gure 8.
In order to specify the re nement relations for input and output, we have to know at any given time which data item from the abstract packet streams is currently being transferred across the given interface. This information is obtained by attaching a tag to each data item. The tags are auxiliary variables, not part of the design, but they travel through the design along with the corresponding data, exactly as if they were part of the real hardware. A tag indicates for a given data item exactly which byte of which packet of which stream the data item derives from. Thus, given the tag and the abstract model, we can always determine the correct value of the data item. Note that, while in the previous example, we used the auxiliary state to store actual data values from the abstract model, in this case, we store pointers into the abstract model instead. Now we come to the proof decomposition. There are two large structures that we have to consider when decomposing the problem. The rst is the set of abstract packet arrays. The second is the bu er memory within the transmit multiplexer. This large space of bu er memory is used to store packets from the various sources while they are being accumulated and waiting for transmission. As before, we can use path splitting to break these large structures into their respective components. When verifying that a data item at the output is correct according to its tag, we rst of all consider only the case of one particular tag i. This corresponds to one particular data item in the abstract model. Hence, all of the other items can be abstracted away in the proof. Second, we consider only data items which have been stored in one particular cell of the bu er memory. As before, this means we may have to add some auxiliary state to remember the storage location of the item currently being output. With this reduction, we can consider only one cell of the bu er memory and one data item in the abstract packet stream. By declaring the index types for packet streams and the bu er array to be symmetric, we can reduce the number of cases to prove down to just one. Thus we have reduced a problem of arbitrary size to a problem of xed nite size. Having shown that all data items reaching the output of the transmit multiplexer are correct, we also have to show that the items appear in the correct order. Note that this property relates only to the tags and not to the data items themselves (this speci cation is also part of the re nement relations). Provided that the range of the tags is not too large, this proof can be done directly by model checking. This is because the number of states in the model, when data are excluded, is proportional simply to the number of tags. Using induction (not discussed here) we can also show correct ordering for in nite streams of packets.
A cache coherent multiprocessor
Our nal example is a cache coherence protocol of a commercial multiprocessor, and its implementation in an ASIC. The design and formal veri cation of the protocol, and the portion of the ASIC that implements it, is reported by Eiriksson Eir98] . This work was also done using an earlier version of SMV. Again, the purpose here is not to describe Eiriksson's proof, but to show how in outline the proof ts into the present methodology.
The system in question consists of a collection of processors sharing a common memory address space. Each processor stores a working set of memory locations in a local cache. Consistency between these locally cached copies of memory locations is maintained by a protocol, which sends messages over an unordered store-and-forward network. The protocol itself was veri ed by model checking, using an abstract model of the system. In this model, receiving a message and transmitting a response is modeled as a single atomic event. This abstract model, once veri ed, is used as the basis to specify and verify the implementation, by means of re nement relations. This approach is depicted in gure 9. The implementation itself (described at the RTL level in the Verilog language) is substantially more complex than the abstract model. The design contains, for example, a collection of FIFO bu ers to handle incoming and outgoing messages, arbitration logic to handle the routing of messages onto buses, a pipeline to handle the processing of protocol state transitions, a content addressable memory (CAM) to store the state of pending transactions by address, an intermediate storage memory for holding data associated with pending transactions, and so on. All told the protocol is implemented in roughly 30,000 lines of synthesizable Verilog
The implementation logic is veri ed by writing re nement relations that relate values at certain points in the implementation with values in the abstract model. Once again, to specify the correct value of data items at any point in the design, we add auxiliary state to the model. The auxiliary variables in this case are tags that indicate which protocol message in the abstract model a given data item is associated with. These tags move through the system along with the corresponding data. This makes it possible to specify, at a given time and place, what the correct value of a given data item is. This in turn allows us to break a large design into pieces of tractable size for veri cation, and verify each piece in the context of the abstract model.
As in the previous example, there are also several large data structures that need to be decomposed by path splitting. The most important of these is the memory itself, which we divide into its elements by considering the correctness of only those transactions relating to one particular memory address. Similarly, to handle large FIFO bu ers, we consider the correctness of only data items that pass through a particular cell of the circular bu er that implements the FIFO. To handle the CAM that holds the state of pending transactions, we consider only those transactions that fall into a particular cell of the CAM, and so on. As before, symmetry considerations then can be used to reduce the number of proof obligations to a tractable level. For example, the memory addresses are symmetric, as are CAM indices, and the message bu ers in the abstract model that represent the store-and-forward network. Data type reductions can then be used to reduce the large types, such as addresses, to a small number of values, for any given case.
Thus the cache coherence system is veri ed by applying the same basic proof methodology as in the previous examples.
Related work
This work is chie y concerned with combining a set of proof techniques into a methodology for system level formal veri cation in the hardware domain. Many of the individual techniques used in this methodology are related to techniques in the literature, and we consider some of these connections here.
We begin with the circular compositional method. Compositional methods in the temporal framework were originally described in terms of an \assumption/guarantee" paradigm Pnu84]. Each component of a system was to be speci ed by those temporal properties which it assumes about its environment, and those temporal properties which it will guarantee, provided the assumptions hold. Thus, if a given process assumes P and guarantees Q, then if we compose it with a process that guarantees P (under no assumptions), we can infer Q. This is essentially no di erent from Hoare logic, except in that the formulas are temporal, and composition of programs is parallel rather than sequential. However, this temporal aspect introduces a serious di culty. That is, when composing two processes A and B, it is often necessary to assume correctness of A to verify B and vice versa. This is not a problem in Hoare logic, since for a sequential program, we do not require that the guarantees made by A and B hold simultaneously. The inference rule for the \while" statement in e ect allows us to construct circular proofs. In the parallel case, however, both speci cations A and B must hold simultaneously, and thus a proof may not be circular. In practice, we may easily nd that there is no place to begin a non-circular assume/guarantee proof, because no process satis es any useful properties in the absence of environment assumptions.
This \environment" problem was recognized by Abadi and Lamport AL93]. They showed the somewhat surprising fact that under certain restrictions on the processes and on the temporal properties to be proved, if one can prove P assuming Q and prove Q assuming P, then both P and Q must hold. To simplify somewhat, these restrictions were essentially as follows: 1) the processes must modify disjoint subsets of the system variables in an interleaved manner, and 2) each property must be a safety property and restrict only state variables of one process. Given these assumptions, one can show that the truth of P at time t cannot depend on Q holding at any time later than t ? 1, and vice versa. Thus, P and Q are proved in e ect by mutual induction over time. This argument would not hold, however, if either P or Q contained operators that refer to the future.
The technique is thus restricted to safety properties (in temporal logic, the properties expressible in the form Gp, where p is a past-time formula). Alur and Henzinger AH96] extended this approach to the case where the processes and properties are both represented by synchronous Mealy machines (a method embodied in the Mocha system AHM + 98]). This relaxes the requirement of interleaving concurrency, but still allows only safety properties to be veri ed.
Nonetheless, mutual dependence of liveness properties does occur in real systems. Consider, for example, the problem of multiple execution units in an instruction set processor. At some times, the instruction in unit A may depend on the result of the instruction in unit B, and at other times the inverse relation may hold. Thus, in order to prove that unit A is live (always eventually produces a result), we must assume the B is live, and vice versa. An example of such a liveness proof can be found in McM99a] . The technique of circular compositional proofs used here allows for this kind of circular reasoning, even about liveness properties. In essence, it makes explicit the induction over time implied in the above approach, by assuming property P only up to time t ? 1 when proving Q at time t, and vice versa. As we have seen, since this condition (Q up to t ? 1 implies P up to t) is expressible in temporal logic, the local proof subgoals generated by a circular compositional proof can be veri ed by model checking.
The technique of temporal case splitting can be viewed as simply a temporal version of the \excluded middle" principle. Thus it undoubtedly has many precedents in earlier systems. What is possibly new about this technique is that, rather than splitting a proof into cases based on the truth of a proposition, one splits into cases based on the set of times at which a variable has a particular value. More particularly, the notion of splitting up a proof into cases based on the path a data item takes through a system appears to be novel, at least insofar as its application to model checking is concerned.
The use of symmetric types to infer symmetry in a design has its roots in the Murphi veri cation system ID96]. However, in Murphi, the symmetry is used to reduce the size of the state space, while here it is used to reduced the number of cases of a parameterized property that must be veri ed.
The technique of data type reduction presented here is a special case of abstract interpretation CC77]. It is related to reductions based on data independence Wol86] in that large data types are reduced to small nite ones by using a few speci c values and an extra value to represent the remaining elements of the type. However, the technique does not require control to be independent of data. For example, it allows control to depend on comparisons of data items. This is signi cant, in that the technique can be applied to reduce addresses, tags and pointers, which are commonly compared to determine control behavior. Also, the technique reduces not only the data types in question, but also any arrays indexed by these types. This makes it possible to reduce systems with large or unbounded memory arrays, register les, FIFO bu ers, etc., to a small nite size.
Lazic and Roscoe LR98] also describe a technique for reducing systems with unbounded arrays to nite systems for veri cation, under certain restrictions. Their technique is a complete procedure for verifying a particular property (determinism). It works by identifying a nite con guration of a system, whose determinism implies determinism of of any larger con gurations. The technique presented here, on the other hand, is not restricted to a particular property or class of properties. More importantly, the method of LR98] does not allow equality comparison of values stored in arrays, nor the storage of array indices in arrays. Thus, it cannot be applied to, for example, unbounded cache memories, content-addressable memories, or the example presented here, an outof-order processor that stores tags (i.e., array indices) in arrays, and compares them for equality. It should be noted, in fact, that comparing values stored in an unbounded array, or even including one bit of status information in elements of an unbounded array, is su cient to make reachability analysis undecidable. Unfortunately, these conditions are ubiquitous in hardware design. Thus, while the technique presented here is incomplete, being based on a conservative abstraction, this incompleteness should be viewed as inevitable if we wish to verify hardware designs for unbounded resources.
Data type reduction has also been described previously by Long Lon93] in his work on automatically generating abstractions. However, that work applied only to concrete nite types. Here, data type reductions are used in combination with symmetry and case splitting, to allow the reduction of types of arbitrary or in nite size to nite types. In addition, Long's work did not treat the reduction of arrays. What makes it possible to do this with the present technique is the combination of data type reductions with temporal case splitting and symmetry reductions, a combination which appears to be novel.
The use of uninterpreted functions here is also substantially di erent from previous applications. The basic reason for using uninterpreted functions is the same { to abstract away from the actual functions computed on data in order to reason separately about arithmetic and data ow. However, existing techniques using uninterpreted functions, such as BD94, JDB95, HB95, SJD98, VB98a, BBCZ98] are based essentially on symbolic simulation. In these methodologies, one attempts to prove a commutative diagram. In the simplest case, one shows that, from any state, applying an abstraction function and then a step of the speci cation model is equivalent to applying a step of the implementation model and then the abstraction function. However, since not all states are reachable, in general the user must provide an inductive invariant on the state space. The commutative diagram is proved only for those states satisfying the invariant. By contrast, in the present technique, uninterpreted functions are used in the context of temporal veri cation (i.e., model checking). In this case, there is no need to provide an inductive invariant, since the model checker is proving that a given temporal property holds at the initial state, rather than that a commutative diagram holds at every state. In e ect, we are relying on the model checker's ability to compute the strongest invariant (i.e., the set of reachable states) rather than supplying an invariant by hand. Note that in general, when uninterpreted functions with equality are added to temporal logic, the resulting logic is undecidable. The technique presented here is not a decision procedure for such a logic, but rather a technique of reduction to propositional temporal logic that is necessarily incomplete. Others have presented a semi-decision procedure for such a logic HIKB96], however this technique is sound only in a very restricted case; for most problems of practical interest, the procedure is not sound, and can only be used as a heuristic to nd counterexamples.
Finally, a number of authors report the use of general purpose proof assistants, without model checking, in processor veri cation (for example Cyr96, VB98b, WAH94, SWAH98]).
To conclude, the methods presented here are novel in several aspects: rst the particular methods of circular compositional proof, symmetry reduction, and data type reduction and the method of handling uninterpreted functions are novel in and of themselves. Second, the combination of these techniques into a methodology for hardware veri cation is novel. Finally, the implementation of all these techniques into a mechanical proof system based on symbolic model checking is novel.
Conclusion
We have seen that a proof strategy based on a few simple, somewhat domain speci c proof techniques can be used to break the veri cation of a large and complex hardware system down into a tractable number of nite state subgoals, with few enough state variables to be veri ed by model checking.
This strategy appears to be reasonably generic, in that it can be applied, for example, to such diverse hardware applications as out-of-order instruction set processors, cache coherence systems and packet handlers for communication systems. It allows these designs to be veri ed at both an abstract level, and at the \RTL" level. From this level, designs may be either synthesized directly into logic gates, or compared to gate level designs using combination equivalence tools KSL95]. The methodology has in practice been applied to a very large design in a commercial design environment Eir98]. Nonetheless, there is no evidence to indicate that application of the methodology to additional designs will not reveal weaknesses which would require the incorporation of additional proof techniques. For example, the notion of data type reduction has already been extended to support an inductive data type, which allows incrementation (i.e., a successor function) as well as equality comparison. This can be used, for example, to show that a FIFO bu er delivers an in nite sequence of packets in the correct order. Thus, the system described here should be viewed as a work in progress.
In essence, the methodology presented here is an attempt to combine in a practical way the strengths of model checking and theorem proving. The re nement relation approach, combined with the various available reductions and model checking, makes it possible to avoid writing detailed assertions about every state holding component of the design, and also to avoid interactively generated proof scripts. In this way, the manual e ort of proofs is reduced. In particular, the model checker's ability to compute the strongest invariant of a model is pervasively exploited to avoid writing inductive invariants of the system by hand. The proofs thus obtained, involving less design detail, are arguably less vulnerable to small changes in the design. This is illustrated by the example of adding a re-order bu er to an implementation of Tomasulo's algorithm, while reusing without modi cation the original proof. On the other hand, the ability of theorem proving to break large proofs down into smaller ones is exploited to avoid model checking's strict limits on model size. Thus, by combining the strengths of these two methods, we may arrive at a scalable methodology for formal hardware veri cation.
